© notice, is given to the source. Subjective Health Expectations ∗ by Juergen Jung et al.
Towson University 
Department of Economics 
Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 2010-08 
 
 
Subjective Health Expectations 
  
 
by 
 
By Juergen Jung and Kim P. Huynh 
 
 
May, 2014 
 
 
 
 
©  2014  by  Author.  All  rights  reserved.  Short  sections  of  text,  not  to  exceed  two 
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including 
© notice, is given to the source. Subjective Health Expectations
Kim P. Huynhy
Bank of Canada
Juergen Jungz
Towson University
May 9, 2014
Abstract
Subjective health expectations are derived using data from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS). We ﬁrst use a Bayesian updating mechanism to correct for focal point responses and
reporting errors of the original health expectations variable. We then test the quality of the
health expectations measure and describe its correlation with various health indicators and
other individual characteristics. Our results indicate that subjective health expectations do
contain additional information that is not incorporated in subjective mortality expectations
and that the rational expectations assumption cannot be rejected for subjective health expec-
tations. Finally, the data suggest that individuals younger than 70 years of age seem to be
more pessimistic about their health than individuals in their 70’s.
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Standard macroeconomic models impose rational expectations as a modeling device. However,
Manski (2004) makes the case for the more frequent use of direct measures of subjective expecta-
tions in economics and foresees the need for research on how such expectations are formed. From
the empirical literature such as Benitez-Silva and Ni (2008), Hurd (2009), and Khwaja, Sloan and
Chung (2007), we know that self reported subjective probability measures in household surveys
have strong predictive power. This is especially true when individuals have considerable private
information which is common when dealing with health and mortality issues. In addition, sub-
jective mortality expectations have been used to explain retirement, cf. O’Donnell, Tappa and
Doorslaer (2008), and savings decisions cf. Bloom et al. (2006). However, results obtained from
using subjective mortality expectations data are somewhat diﬀerent from results obtained using
health outcome variables. The latter are shown to have a much stronger inﬂuence on retirement
decisions than the expectations variables, cf. Siddiqui (1997) and Dwyer and Mitchell (1998).
Most of the literature, such as Hurd (1989), Hurd and McGarry (1995), Hurd and McGarry
(2002), Gan et al. (2004), Van Solinge and Henkens (2010), that connects subjective expectations
with labor supply and retirement decisions concentrates on the role of mortality expectations and
ignores subjective expectations about future health issues.
In this paper, we argue that expectations about future health events are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from expectations about future mortality. Auld (2002) ﬁnds that changes in health do not have
the same eﬀects as changes in life-expectancy, although both are closely linked. Fortunately
the Health Retirement Study (HRS), a panel data survey that covers the elderly in the U.S.
from 1992 onwards, reports measures about subjective health expectations. More speciﬁcally,
these data provide information about individuals’ expectations about future work limiting health
problems and the actual occurrence of such health problems which allows us to systematically
analyze subjective expectations about future health.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Subjective health expectations about future work
limiting health problems seem to consistently predict health outcomes. The rational expectations
hypothesis cannot be rejected for subjective health expectations. Since a high percentage of the
answers to the health expectations question are focal points, we correct for focal points using a
Bayesian algorithm. After ﬁltering the subjective expectations from reporting errors they become
even more similar to rationally formed expectations. Younger cohorts are more pessimistic about
their future health than older cohorts. Finally, we are able to show that subjective expectations
about future health events carry additional information that is not contained in subjective survival
expectations. We therefore argue that it is important to understand how individuals form beliefs
1about their future health in order to improve economic models that simulate household decision
making over the life-cycle.
To justify the importance of the results of the health expectations variable we ﬁrst analyze
the health outcome variable and connect it to results from the literature on disability. We then
test how well subjective expectations about such work limiting health problems predict health
outcomes and whether such expectations are formed rationally. The health variable that we use
for this analysis is work limiting health problems from the HRS data. We refer to this variable
as Health-Problem from now on. This binary variable indicates whether an impairment or health
problem exists and limits the kind or amount of paid work the respondent is able to perform.
The HRS does not deﬁne what a work limiting health problem is. We therefore quantify Health-
Problem by investigating its correlation with various health indicators as well as demographic and
income variables. The HRS data set is very rich in detailed questions about the health status of
its respondents, so that regressions of this form will give an indication of which health problems
are more likely to constitute work limiting health problems.
An obstacle with using subjective health expectations are focal point responses. In wave 1,
18:2 percent of respondents indicate a zero probability of acquiring a work limiting health problem
within the next 10 years, whereas 4:7 percent think that they will have a work limiting health
problem with probability one. There is a third focal point at 50 percent. Roughly 30 percent
of respondents expect a work limiting health problem with probability one-half. We ﬁnd similar
results for the remaining waves. Expectations of zero and one are not very sensible while 50
percent is coarse at best. Perry (2005) ﬁnds that individuals answering with focal responses of
zero and one on an expected mortality question are on average less educated, hold fewer assets
and have lower income than the rest of the sample whereas respondents reporting a 50 percent
chance of surviving up to a target age look essentially the same as the rest of the sample. He
therefore suggests that answers of zero and one may be more a sign of poor understanding of the
question than of optimism or pessimism. In order to correct for focal point responses a Bayesian
updating mechanism is used following a procedure developed by Gan, Hurd and McFadden (2005).
We then test whether health expectations are consistent with health outcomes, formed rationally,
and provide information that is not contained in other expectations variables such as mortality
expectations.
In this paper we make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the lit-
erature that links disability to work limiting health problems. Kapteyn, Smith and Soest (2008)
report that disability from various health impairments is highly correlated with work limiting
health problems. It has also been reported that disability and other work impairments do have
strong eﬀects on labor market decisions (e.g. Gannon (2005) or Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995)).
2An important research objective will therefore be to understand how individuals form expectations
about possible future health impairments and how such expectations inﬂuence current economic
decisions. We do make progress in this direction by ﬁnding that the rationality of health expecta-
tions cannot be rejected. In a similar setting Ludwig and Zimper (2007) present various models
of learning of subjective mortality expectations.1
We also contribute to the literature that tests whether subjective expectations are formed
rationally. Rationality assumptions have been tested using survey data by Bernheim (1990),
Das and Soest (1997), Das and Soest (1999), Benitez-Silva et al. (2008), and more recently by
Dave (2011). Pesaran and Weale (2006) provide a summary of the literature on expectations in
household surveys. There is some evidence that individuals form expectations in a rational manner
(i.e. Bernheim (1990), Benitez-Silva et al. (2008)) but this depends on the particular context that
a decision maker is in. Dave (2011), for instance, does not ﬁnd prove for either rational or adaptive
expectations about capital expenditures on machinery and equipment in Canadian manufacturing
plants that instead exhibit a regressive expectations process. Our approach most closely follows
Bernheim (1990) and Benitez-Silva et al. (2008) and similar to their results we also cannot reject
the rational expectations hypothesis.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 3 analyzes the
subjective health expectations measure. We correct for focal point responses, test for consistency,
informational content and rationality of these self-reported health expectations. Section 4 adds a
discussion about the importance of work limiting health problems in economic modeling. Section
5 concludes the paper. A detailed appendix is available on the authors website.2
2 Data
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a longitudinal household survey data set for the
study of retirement and health among the elderly in the United States. With the goal of making
the data more accessible to researchers, the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, with funding
and support from the National Institute on Aging (NIA) and the Social Security Administration
(SSA), created several products, including the RAND HRS Data File, which is a user-friendly
ﬁle derived from all HRS waves. It is a composite data set that combines four cohort studies to
construct a nationally representative data base of the older population in the U.S. The cohorts
are the AHEAD cohorts born before 1924; the CODA cohorts born between 1924 1930; the HRS
cohorts born between 1931   1941 and the War Baby cohorts born between 1942   1947: The
1We leave the analysis of learning health expectations and the impacts of health expectations on labor market
and savings decisions for future research.
2http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/papers/TechnicalAppendixSubHealthExp.pdf
3largest of these surveys is the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) conducted by the Institute for
Social Research at the University of Michigan. It covers a broad range of topics, including health,
income, assets, employment, retirement, insurance, and family structure. In this paper we use six
waves of data from surveys conducted every two years between 1992   2002.
The majority of respondents in wave 1 of the HRS were 51 to 61 years old when the survey
was ﬁrst conducted in 1992. The baseline survey included 12;652 persons, or 7;600 households,
with oversampling of Mexican-Americans, African-Americans and residents of Florida. Juster
and Suzman (1995) present a general overview of the HRS, Wallace and Herzog (1995) review the
health measures in particular and Hurd and McGarry (1995) evaluate the subjective probabilities
of survival. In the following we will concentrate on the population aged between 40 and 80 years
in wave 1 who will turn 52 and 92 years respectively in wave 7. Wave 7 does not contain the
health expectations variable anymore so that we can only use waves 1 6 (years 1992 - 2002). We
will restrict the descriptive statistics to these waves so that we are left with 39;442 observations.
Figure 1 contains histograms of the age distributions in the various waves and table 6:1 presents
summary statistics of the pooled data of wave 1   6.
3 Health Expectations
We call the variable concerning individual expectations about future work limiting health problems
Health-Expectation. The exact wording of the survey question is:
“What about the chances that your health will limit your work activity during the next 10
years?”
Respondents can answer with a number from 0 to 100; where 0 indicates an individuals sub-
jective believe that there is absolutely no chance of developing a work limiting health problem and
100 means that the person is absolutely certain that a health problem will develop. Histograms
of Health-Expectation by gender for waves 2 to 6 are reported in ﬁgure 2:
It is not entirely clear what individuals form expectations about when asked about their
expectation concerning future work limiting health problem. The data do, however, contain a
variable called “work limiting health problems” which is deﬁned as follows:
“Now we want to ask how your health aﬀects paid work activities. Do you have any impairment
or health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?”
In order to quantify this variable we use a discrete-choice model to estimate what causes such
work limiting health problems.3 We ﬁnd that measures for earnings are negatively correlated
with health problems whereas asset holdings turn out to be not signiﬁcant in explaining this type
3Results of detailed regressions of this kind are available in a technical appendix from the authors’ website.
4of health problem. Men are more likely to develop work limiting health problems and, perhaps
surprisingly, age is negatively correlated with work limiting health problems. Finally, healthy
lifestyle choices like regular exercise are negatively correlated with health problems. However,
after controlling for endogeneity using a more sophisticated instrumental variables estimator using
lagged values as regressors to ensure exogeneity, lifestyle choices are not signiﬁcant anymore, with
the exception of smoking.4
The standard criticism concerning the use of self reported data in this context is that indi-
viduals tend to answer that they do have work limiting health problems to justify that they are
out of work. Estimates therefore tend to overstate the health eﬀects on hours worked. See French
(2003) for a discussion of this issue. Other issues with self-reported mortality and health data
include perception diﬀerences by age and socio-economic status (e.g. Sen (2006), Crossley and
Kennedy (2002)) as well as nationality (e.g. Jürges (2006)).
3.1 Summary Statistics
We next present non-parametric statistics on 40   55 year old individuals of wave 1 and divide
the sample into subgroups by educational attainment and wealth and income quantiles.
Table 2 presents health expectations across all waves according to educational attainment.
Comparing the mean expectations we see that in wave 1, college educated individuals have lower
expectations about having work limiting health problems in the future than their less educated
counterparts. College and above report a 34:2 percent probability versus 43:9 percent; 42:1 percent
and 38:6 percent for no high school, GED and high school graduates respectively. This pattern
repeats itself across all waves, although in later waves as the population gets older the expectations
of higher educated individuals moves closer to expectations of lower educated groups.
Table 3 summarizes health expectations according to wealth quantiles. We ﬁnd a similar
convergence pattern as in the classiﬁcation by educational attainment. Individuals in high wealth
and income quantiles (the income speciﬁc table is available in a technical appendix) have lower
average subjective expectations about having a work limiting health problem within the next ten
years. As the population gets older the expectations converge somewhat for both wealth and
income quantiles.
We next compare the subjective health expectations with the actual occurrence of work lim-
iting health problems a decade later. We report mean values of health expectations in wave 1
(Health-Expectation) and compare them to the realizations of health limiting problems in wave 6
(Health-Problem). Results are reported in table 4.
4We follow Wooldridge (2005) and Hernandez-Quevedo, Jones and Rice (2008) in constructing such a dynamic
regression model. The technical appendix, available upon request, contains the details of this model.
5In table 4 it seems that health expectations are fairly inconsistent when compared with realized
health problems approximately 10 years later. To see this compare the average Health-Expectation
in wave 1 to the average Health-Problem in wave 6. However, if one accounts for individuals
who either left the survey or died from wave 1 to wave 6 (we unfortunately cannot distinguish
between the two cases) then health expectations become more consistent for the age group 45
and above (compare mean of variable Health-Problem-A in table 4). Smith, Taylor and Sloan
(2001) also report that attrition between waves is approximately 20 percent that is not due to
death. Adjusting for this they ﬁnd that the death rates in the HRS data corresponds fairly well
to the decennial life table measures. The same holds true in for a sub-sample where we only
include individuals without work limiting health problems in wave 1. It also appears that males
slightly underpredict future health problems, whereas females slightly overpredict health problems.
From these summary statistics we conclude that expectations about future work limiting health
problems are formed reasonably, that is, consistent with later realizations of such health problems.
3.2 Adjusted Subjective Health Expectations
In ﬁgure 2 we saw earlier that self-reported expectations show focal point responses, especially
high at 0 percent;50 percent and 100 percent. Respondents who report a 100 percent chance
of developing work limiting health problems have on average lower income, asset holdings and
education. All other focal respondents (0 percent and 50 percent probability of developing work
limiting health problems) are similar to the rest of the sample as can be seen from the non-
parametric estimates in table 5. If a respondent thinks that there is absolutely no chance, a zero
probability, of having a work limiting health problem within the next 10 years, the question arises
why one could not just take this value and postulate that the respondent will use exactly this
expectation in her decision process on other economic choice variables (i.e. consumption, savings,
etc.). Since economists are ultimately interested in modeling these decision processes, why not
work with this probability?
We argue that focal point responses cannot reﬂect true probabilities because it is unreasonable
to assume that health expectations that cover a decade can be made with absolute certainty. We
also assume that individuals know this when they actually make their optimizing decision and
simply misreported their subjective probabilities in the survey, so that it makes sense to correct
this reporting error. We correct for this reporting error by creating a new variable for health
expectations called Adjusted-Health-Expectation. There are multiple ways to accomplish this.
First, we could either replace focal point answers of zero with 0:01 and focal point answers of
100 with 99:9 respectively. This method is suggested in Picone et al. (2004). Another method,
suggested by Gan, Hurd and McFadden (2005), uses a Bayesian updating mechanism to smooth
6the focal points. This methods is brieﬂy described as follows.
Using observed outcome probabilities of the variable Health-Problem we can construct a non-
parametric estimate of the population health hazard rate 0a (a + t) per age group a; where
subscript 0 indicates that this is the hazard rate of the population, and a+t indicates the hazard
rate t years from age a: We present the population hazard rate in the top panel of ﬁgure 3 for each
age group. The subjective health hazard rate of an individual i of age a can then be expressed as
scaled hazard function:
ia (a + t) = i0a (a + t);
where i (t) is the subjective hazard rate, i is an idiosyncratic adjustment factor. A value i > 1
indicates a “pessimistic”individual and a value i < 1 indicates an “optimistic” individual. To
construct a measure of i the Bayesian updating model developed in Gan, Hurd and McFadden
(2005) is used.
This method assumes that the prior survival probability distribution (probability of surviving
without a health problem) at a future point in time is a truncated normal distribution between zero
and one. The conditional density of the observed survival probability is assumed to be a censored
normal distribution between zero and one which allows for the focal points. We estimate the
parameters of the truncated and censored normal distributions using a log likelihood procedure
to acquire estimates of (1;2;	), where 1 and 2 are standard deviations of the respective
normal distributions and 	 measures the population’s average degree of optimism. We then
use the posterior density mean as the individual’s estimated subjective survival probability. This
mean will never be at the boundary of the interval from zero to one so that the adjusted subjective
survival probabilities do not contain any more focal points. The details of this procedure as well
as a detailed description of the algorithm is available in a technical appendix on the authors’
website or in the exposition of Gan, Hurd and McFadden (2005).
The procedure only corrects responses of individuals who did not have a work limiting health
problem at the time of the survey, so that some of the focal responses still remain in the sample.
Figure 2 shows the variable Adjusted-Health-Expectation next to the original one. We see that
focal point responses are greatly reduced.
3.3 Are Health Expectations Formed Rationally?
We next employ the framework developed in Bernheim (1990) and Benitez-Silva et al. (2008) to
test whether expectations about work limiting health problems are formed rationally. We use
adjusted health expectations data unless indicated otherwise. An individual is trying to predict
a variable X and has access to certain information during period t. We denote this information
7set by 
t: In period t + 1 the information set is augmented by newly available information !t+1;
so that the new information set is 
t+1 = (
t;!t+1): In our model we impose that individuals
form expectations according to
Xe
t = E (Xj
t);
where E is the expectations operator. This guarantees that errors in expectations will be uncor-
related with the set of variables known at time t: It then follows that
E
 
Xe
t+1j
t

= E [E (Xj
t;!t+1)j
t] = E [Xj
t] = Xe
t :
The evolution of expectations is
Xe
t+1 = Xe
t + t+1; (1)
where the expectations error is t+1 = Xe
t+1   E

Xe
t+1j
t

and
E [t+1j
t] = 0: (2)
From expression (1) and (2) we can derive a regression framework to test for the rational expec-
tations hypothesis, that is
Xe
t+1;i =  + Xe
t;i + 
t;i + t;i; (3)
where i indexes the individual,  is a constant, and  is a parameter vector that estimates the
eﬀect of information in period t on period t + 1 expectations. The rational expectations (RE)
hypothesis then implies that  =  = 0 and  = 1 (strong RE). Weak rationality, according to
Bernheim (1990), assumes  = 0 and tests for  = 0 and  = 1: In both cases expectations follow
a random walk.
Estimating expression (3) with a simple OLS procedure could be misleading due to measure-
ment errors in the dependent variable. We already mentioned that there are focal point responses
in the subjective expectations variables. These lead to trimodal error distributions instead of nor-
mal error distributions. Also, noisy self-reports and omitted variables can make estimation more
complex. Individuals may exaggerate or underestimate their expectations or have other motives
to misrepresent them. We partly corrected for these problems by reducing focal point responses
using the procedure described above.
A test for weak rationality would assume that  = 0 in equation (3) so that the actual
estimation is for
Xe
t+1;i =  + Xe
t;i + t;i: (4)
Expectations are not formed rationally whenever the estimates for  are not close to one and
8the estimate for the intercept  is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (see table 6; second column).
From this we would conclude that health expectations are not formed according to our theory,
so that we would have to reject the weak rationality hypothesis. The same holds true for strong
rationality as can be seen in the ﬁrst column of table 6. Similar results have been found in Dutch
household survey data on income expectations by Das and Soest (1997) and Das and Soest (1999).
We next follow Bernheim (1990) who claims that one should instrument the variable Health-
Expectation with other subjective expectations variables. The use of these variables as instruments
is based on the assumption that individuals’ expectations are internally consistent, in the sense
that all expectations are based on the same information. We therefore use the subjective mortal-
ity expectations Expectation-to-Live-to-75 and Expectation-to-Live-to-85 as instruments for work
limiting health expectations, Health-Expectation and estimate an instrumental variables estimator.
Column 3 to 6 in table 6 report the regression results under strong rationality and weak
rationality assumptions where we also report results using the raw health expectations data that
still contains large numbers of focal point responses (in columns 4 and 6 respectively). In table 6
we only use data from wave 1 and wave 2, however, we ﬁnd similar results when using the entire
panel. When using the instrumental variables procedure, the coeﬃcients on Health-Expectation
are indistinguishable from one and the intercepts are not signiﬁcant. When testing the strong
rationality assumption we ﬁnd that most regressors that stand for information matrix 
t are
insigniﬁcant as well. We therefore are not able to reject the rational expectations hypothesis
anymore so that is appears that the expectations variable Health-Expectation follows a random
walk. Using the adjusted health expectations variable that minimizes the impact of focal point
responses results in slightly stronger results in favor of rational expectations. In general, we need
to be careful with our interpretation because tests of this kind have low power.
As a robustness check we also ran these tests for diﬀerent age groups separately (e.g. 40 50;
55 60, and 60 65) to see whether agents become more or less “rational” as they get older. We
ﬁnd that, indeed, the rational expectations hypothesis can be rejected for younger cohorts but
cannot be rejected as the cohorts get older (the particular results are available upon request from
the authors).
Finally, we observe that agents younger than 70 seem to be more pessimistic about their
health than agents older than 70 (see bottom panel in ﬁgure 3). The self reported probabilities
of contracting a health problem are consistently lower than the actual outcome probabilities of
health problems of these age cohorts. We ﬁnd similar results when estimating a relatively large
hazard scaling parameter using the Bayesian updating procedure of Gan, Hurd and McFadden
(2005). The technical appendix contains details of these parameter estimates. Ludwig and Zimper
(2007) in a similar study highlight the relative pessimism of the younger generations for subjective
9mortality expectations.
4 The Informational Content of Subjective Health Expectations
We next analyze whether there is additional information in the subjective expectations about
work limiting health problems Health-Expectation; that is not contained in subjective expecta-
tions about mortality, that is the expectation to live to age 75 (Expectation-to-Live-to-75) and
the expectation to live to age 85 (Expectation-to-Live-to-85): This is of particular interest as
sometimes mortality expectations are used in lieu of health expectations in economic models of
household behavior (e.g. Hurd (1989) uses mortality expectations as health proxies).
Table 7 reports a Probit regression of Health-Problem2002 in wave 6 on Health-Expectation1992
formed in wave 1, as well as mortality expectations formed in wave 1 (i.e. Expectation-to-Live-
to-751992; and Expectation-to-Live-to-851992). We ﬁnd that even after including mortality expec-
tations into our regression model, the health expectations variable stays signiﬁcant (column 5
in table 7). This indicates that there is additional information in subjective health expectations
that is not covered by subjective mortality expectations. Approximating health expectations with
mortality expectations as it is often done in the literature is therefore a very strong assumption
as it neglects “signiﬁcant” information. We therefore consider it an improvement to use subjective
health expectations information directly when modeling health impairments in household decision
models.
To further test the informational content of subjective health expectations we estimate probit
models of future Health-Problems in wave 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 based on expectations about these
health problems formed in wave 1: Table 8 contains the results. We ﬁnd an interesting change of
the predictive power of subjective health expectations formed in wave 1: It appears that subjective
health expectations are stronger predictors for health problems within 2 years and within 8 and
10 years. However, health problems that start within the next 4 to 6 years are less well predicted.
To test the extent of the additional information carried in subjective health expectations
precisely one would have to incorporate subjective health expectations into a consumption-savings
model and compare the predictions based on this model to predictions based on models using
objective realizations of health states. Only then can one safely quantify the additional eﬀect that
subjective health expectations carry. Modeling a life-cycle model and calibrating or estimating
it would go beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. Gan et al. (2004),
however, do ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvements in using subjective survival expectations in such a
modeling environment. This should give an indication that a similar result is possible using
subjective health expectations.
105 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate work limiting health problems and the expectations about work
limiting health problems. Since subjective health expectations suﬀer from strong focal point
bias, we use a Bayesian correction mechanism and correct for focal point responses. We show
that work limiting health expectations are strongly correlated with other variables measuring
health impairments and as such work limiting health expectations can be linked to the literature
on disabilities. We also ﬁnd that individuals with higher education and higher income report
lower subjective probabilities to contract work impairing health problems and that self reported
expectations about future work limiting health problems match up with the actual realization rates
of such health problems. Therefore, we conclude that expectations are formed consistently.
Finally, we ﬁnd that subjective health expectations do follow somewhat diﬀerent patterns than
mortality expectations and that they do contain additional information that is not contained in
subjective mortality expectations. We test the assumption of rational expectations and do not
reject it for subjective health expectations. In addition, agents younger than 70 seem to be
more pessimistic about their health than agents older than 70 which is consistent with similar
ﬁndings about subjective mortality expectations. The results of our empirical work illustrates
how macroeconomic models can reconcile rational expectations as a modeling device with the
empirical data. To our knowledge this paper presents the ﬁrst systematic analysis of subjective
health expectations. We leave the interesting questions about learning health expectations, the
theoretical details about the formation of such expectations, and the application of subjective
health expectations in dynamic household modeling for future research.
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146 Appendix: Tables and Figures
6.1 Tables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Health Expectation 39.69 28.27 39442
Adjusted Health Expectation 43 16.08 35200
Health Problem 0.11 0.31 39415
Expectation to Live to 75 67.71 27.12 34085
Expectation to Live to 85 45 31.14 25934
Age 57.73 6.39 39442
Male 0.46 0.5 39442
> 12 Years Education 0.46 0.5 39372
Living with Partner 0.78 0.41 39404
Full Time Employed 0.83 0.38 39442
Part Time Employed 0.03 0.17 39442
Asset Holdings in $1,000 0.31 0.97 39442
Earnings in $1,000 26.67 40.03 39442
Log of Out-of-Pocket Expenses 5.60 2.47 39442
Log of Health Expenses 7.13 2.13 39442
Smoker 0.21 0.41 39285
Physical Eﬀort at Work 0.36 0.48 37658
Body Mass Index 27.32 4.94 39046
Mother Still Alive 0.39 0.49 38789
Father Still Alive 0.16 0.37 38705
Very Good Health 0.35 0.48 39439
Good Health 0.3 0.46 39439
Fair Health 0.11 0.31 39439
Poor Health 0.02 0.14 39439
Table 1: Summary statistics. Source HRS 1992-2002.
15No High School GED High School Some College College
Wave 1: 1992
Mean 42.56 43.42 37.14 36.37 32.23
Std.Dev. 29.84 26.89 27.87 27.64 23.63
N 766 190 1452 963 887
Wave 2: 1994
Mean 39.84 39.66 35.28 32.53 30.00
Std.Dev. 30.45 29.12 26.31 28.52 24.56
N 821 211 1556 1045 905
Wave 3: 1996
Mean 41.33 39.94 37.91 35.71 34.04
Std.Dev. 30.90 28.67 28.59 27.59 24.69
N 513 154 1153 793 735
Wave 4: 1998
Mean 42.35 41.76 39.49 36.71 35.56
Std.Dev. 29.39 28.30 27.66 26.63 25.39
N 470 136 1027 694 661
Wave 5: 2000
Mean 43.52 46.33 42.98 40.48 38.48
Std.Dev. 28.51 28.83 27.05 27.04 24.24
N 377 120 821 599 595
Wave 6: 2002
Mean 44.20 46.91 44.70 40.98 39.57
Std.Dev. 29.79 28.24 27.35 27.05 25.70
N 304 97 690 508 504
Table 2: Health Expectations by Educational Attainment.
We follow the wave 1 age group of 40-55 year old individuals up to wave 6.
161st Quantile 2nd Quantile 3rd Quantile 4th Quantile
Wave 1: 1992
Mean 42.95 38.83 36.04 32.54
Std.Dev. 29.44 26.63 27.06 26.54
N 834 1127 1162 1135
Wave 2: 1994
Mean 39.32 36.62 33.14 30.52
Std.Dev. 30.31 27.85 26.44 25.68
N 921 1179 1243 1199
Wave 3: 1996
Mean 41.05 39.15 35.36 34.15
Std.Dev. 28.95 28.48 27.23 27.23
N 639 892 937 885
Wave 4: 1998
Mean 40.74 38.87 38.38 36.47
Std.Dev. 30.05 27.04 26.19 26.59
N 590 804 826 774
Wave 5: 2000
Mean 46.78 41.38 41.95 37.41
Std.Dev. 28.16 26.06 27.13 25.39
N 473 673 732 638
Wave 6: 2002
Mean 45.24 42.08 42.68 41.23
Std.Dev. 29.09 27.55 26.60 26.63
N 396 578 599 534
Table 3: Health Expectations per Wealth Quantiles.
We follow the wave 1 age group of 40-55 year old individuals up to wave 6.
17MALE
Full Sample Sub-sample
Age 40-45 45-50 50-55 Age 40-45 45-50 50-55
Wave 1: 1992
Mean(Health Expectation) 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.37
N 32 206 1757 30 187 1607
Wave 6: 2002
Mean(Health Problem) 0.48 0.41 0.43 0.21 0.15 0.18
N 29 196 1587 24 166 1340
Wave 6-A: 2002
Mean(Health Problem-A) 0.56 0.38 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.49
N 43 251 2197 35 204 1790
FEMALE
Full Sample Sub-sample
Age 40-45 45-50 50-55 Age 40-45 45-50 50-55
Wave 1: 1992
Mean(Health Expectation) 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.37
N 262 753 1551 242 683 1443
Wave 6: 2002
Mean(Health Problem) 0.17 0.24 0.30 0.11 0.17 0.21
N 287 844 1913 250 708 1559
Wave 6-A: 2002
Mean(Health Problem-A) 0.33 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.49
N 354 1067 2483 299 890 1999
Table 4: Consistency of the Health Expectations Variable.
The table reports the average of self-reported health expectations in 1992 and the realizations of
actual health problems 10 years later in 2002. Health Problems-A counts all individuals having
left the survey (due to death or attrition) as having a health problem, so that the variable Health
Problem is set to one for such individuals.
The sub-sample reports the average of self-reported health expectations of individuals without
work limiting health problems in 1992 and thus comprises a healthier subset of individuals.
18Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Total sample
Age 51.70 3.23 25348
Income 221866.05 542110.74 25205
Earnings 21688.21 33724.88 25205
Education years 12.65 3.05 25272
Male (1/0) 0.65 0.48 25348
No focal points
Age 51.68 3.23 18143
Income 228428.72 582477.98 18000
Earnings 20449.79 35667.47 18000
Education years 12.63 3.16 18080
Male (1/0) 0.66 0.47 18143
Health-Expectation = 50
Age 51.95 3.04 4109
Income 187931.40 389059.87 4109
Earnings 24876.26 25136.10 4109
Education years 12.75 2.69 4102
Male (1/0) 0.63 0.48 4109
Health-Expectation = 0
Age 51.41 3.48 2602
Income 242115.61 474436.84 2602
Earnings 25966.31 32981.16 2602
Education years 12.78 2.69 2596
Male (1/0) 0.66 0.47 2602
Health-Expectation = 100
Age 52.00 3.16 494
Income 158344.27 413996.77 494
Earnings 17761.48 21078.79 494
Education years 11.77 3.20 494
Male (1/0) 0.61 0.49 494
Table 5: Summary by Expected Work Limiting Health Problem: Age 40-60
19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strong Weak IV-Strong IV-Strong IV-Weak IV-Weak
R.E. R.E. R.E. R.E.-raw R.E. R.E.-raw
Health Expectation 10.04 10.05
(0.14) (0.10)
Adjusted Health Expectation 0.26 0.40 10.03 10.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.14) (0.09)
Expectation to Live to 75 -0.02
(0.01)
Expectation to Live to 85 -0.05
(0.01)
Age 0.69 -0.06 0.20
(0.07) (0.16) (0.15)
Male -10.46 -0.81 0.10
(0.62) (0.76) (10.52)
> 12 Years Education -0.62 -0.84 -10.62
(0.61) (0.74) (10.42)
Living with Partner -10.08 0.10 0.14
(0.65) (0.84) (10.55)
Employed Full Time 10.49 -0.07 20.81
(10.09) (10.41) (20.57)
Employed Part Time 20.01 20.93 40.46
(10.98) (20.35) (40.29)
Asset Holdings -0.16 -0.50 -0.73
(0.32) (0.40) (0.78)
Earnings in $1,000 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log of Out-of-Pocket Expenses -0.10 -0.01 -0.01
(0.11) (0.13) (0.24)
Log of Health Expenses 0.10 0.11 0.24
(0.13) (0.15) (0.29)
Smoker -0.57
(0.66)
Daily Physical Activity -0.84
(0.58)
Physical Eﬀort Work -0.35 -10.25 -20.60
(0.58) (0.70) (10.33)
Body Mass Index -0.06 -0.08 -0.13
(0.06) (0.07) (0.13)
Mother Alive 10.15
(0.51)
Father Alive -10.39
(0.63)
Very Good Health 0.46 -10.14 -10.86
(0.61) (0.81) (10.56)
Good Health 20.40 0.41 -0.39
(0.75) (10.03) (20.06)
Fair Health 20.78 -0.99 -20.86
(10.29) (10.76) (30.43)
Poor Health -0.97 -110.21 -200.85
(50.79) (60.95) (130.80)
N 3295 3295 3295 3295 3295 3295
R2 0.21 0.13 . . . .
Table 6: Tests for Strong and Weak Rational Expectations.
We use a linear probability model and regress adjusted as well as non-adjusted health expectations
measures. We only use data from year 1994 and the variable Health   Expectation from 1996
which leaves us with 3295 observations. The models estimated in the table are: Strong Rational
Expectations, Weak Rational Expectations, Strong Rational Expectations using an instrumental
variables estimator, Strong Rational Expectations with IV using on-adjusted raw data, Weak
Rational Expectations with IV, and Weak Rational Expectations with IV using raw, non-adjusted,
data.
Regressors not reported include industry and region dummy variables as well as health indicator
variables from the principle components analysis reported earlier. Signiﬁcance levels are denoted
*, **, and *** for 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.
20(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit-1-raw Probit-2 Probit-3 Probit-4 Probit-5
Adjusted Health Expectation .013
 .013
 .013
 .013

(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
Health Expectation .007

(.001)
Expectation to Live to 75 -.0004 -.0007
(.002) (.002)
Expectation to Live to 85 -.0001 .0003
(.001) (.002)
N 2270 2270 2270 2270 2270
Table 7: Information content of Health-Expectation. Dependent variable is Health-Problem (work
limiting health problems) in year 2002. Independent variables are from year 1992:
We also control for an identical set of regressors as in Table 6 - Model 1 as well for industry and
regional eﬀects (not reported due to space constraints). Signiﬁcance levels are denoted *, **, and
*** for 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively while standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Probit-1-1994 Probit-1996 Probit-1998 Probit-2000 Probit-2002
Adjusted Health Expectation .014
 .007
 .011
 .013
 .013

(.004) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Expectation to Live to 75 .002 .002 -.004 .001 -.0007
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Expectation to Live to 85 .0006 -.002 -.0007 -.002 .0003
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
N: 2114 1908 1928 1879 2270
Table 8: Information content of Health-Expectation. Dependent variable is Health-Problem (work
limiting health problems) in year 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. Independent variables are
from year 1992:
We also control for an identical set of regressors as in Table 6 - Model 1 as well for industry and
regional eﬀects (not reported due to space constraints). Signiﬁcance levels are denoted *, **, and
*** for 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively while standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Age distributions, waves 1 to 6
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Figure 2: Histogram of Health Expectations (expected work limiting health problems) and Ad-
justed Health Expectations of Males and Females Between Age 40-60
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Figure 3: The top panel depicts conditional and unconditional hazard rates of developing a Health
Problem (i.e., a work limiting health problem).
The conditional hazard rate only counts individuals that transition from a state without having
a health problem to a state of having a health problem. The bottom panel compares cumulative
population hazard rates over a 10 year horizon with subjective health hazard rates over the same
time frame. Naturally the hazard rates in the bottom panel are higher than the 2 year hazard
rates in the top panel. The data is from RAND-HRS,wave 1-6.
Note: We use the conditional hazard rate (conditional on being without a health problem) for
our calculations as this counts only the newly sick as failures in the hazard calculation. The
unconditional hazard rate also counts individuals that transition from a state of having a health
problem to the state of (still) having a health problem two years later. It is for this “double
counting” that the unconditional hazard rate is higher.
24